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Chapter 1
Contrasting Cases:
The Lotka-Volterra Model Times Three
Tarja Knuuttila and Andrea Loettgers
Abstract How do philosophers of science make use of historical case studies? Are
their accounts of historical cases purpose-built and lacking in evidential strength as
a result of putting forth and discussing philosophical positions? We will study these
questions through the examination of three different philosophical case studies. All
of them focus on modeling and on Vito Volterra, contrasting his work to that of other
theoreticians. We argue that the worries concerning the evidential role of historical
case studies in philosophy are partially unfounded, and the evidential and hermeneu-
tical roles of case studies need not be played against each other. In philosophy of
science, case studies are often tied to conceptual and theoretical analysis and de-
velopment, rendering their evidential and theoretic/hermeneutic roles intertwined.
Moreover, the problems of resituating or generalizing local knowledge are not spe-
cific to philosophy of science but commonplace in many scientific practices—which
show similarities to the actual use of historical case studies by philosophers of sci-
ence.
1.1 Introduction
Philosophers of science make frequent use of case studies, and the use of case stud-
ies has become even more prevalent in recent years with the more marked practice–
orientation of even mainstream philosophy of science. Yet the case study method-
ology is rarely discussed by philosophers of science, and even more rarely is their
own use of case studies reflected on. Some philosophical reflections on case stud-
ies (e.g. by Shrader-Frechette and McCoy (1994), Morgan (2012), Morgan (2014),
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Ankeny (2012)), discuss the use of cases in scientific discourses but not as vehicles
of philosophical theorizing. The lack of reflection among philosophers concerning
their own use of case studies seems curious, since, on the face of it, the philosophi-
cal use of cases might seem problematical—unless they were understood as a mere
means of illustration. The issue, of course, concerns generalization. Philosophical
reflection often moves on a general conceptual level, and the question is how a sin-
gle case, or any limited number of cases, for that matter, is going to give us general
insights. In other words, is there a gap between specific historical cases and general
philosophical theorizing?
Pitt (2001) thinks that this is indeed the case: according to his analysis, the use
of historical cases as evidence for philosophical theorizing is highly problematical.
In particular, their use is subject to the following dilemma. On the one hand, if the
cases were used to back up a general philosophical claim, the question is how one,
or a few, episodes of science can really establish it, and, furthermore, to what extent
they have been fabricated in order to fit the philosophical thesis in question. On the
other hand, if one starts from the case study and attempts to work one’s way up
to interesting philosophical conclusions, it is far from clear how this is supposed
to be happening. Pitt’s rather skeptical conclusions concerning the possible role of
historical case studies in philosophy has generated a debate with some of counter-
arguments and qualifications. Pitt concludes: “even very good case studies do no
philosophical work. They are at best heuristics” (Pitt (2001), p. 373). In response to
Pitt, Burian (2001, p. 387) argued that Pitt’s “ ‘dilemma is a false dilemma.’ ” He
demonstrates with reference to some examples drawn from the history of molecular
biology that case studies help to shed light on such styles of scientific work and
modes of argumentation that had not, so far, received due recognition in standard
philosophical analyses. According to Burian, Pitt’s dilemma only applies if we take
the doubtful view of philosophy of science as aiming at the discovery of a univer-
sal or objective scientific method. He sees more fruitful philosophical work done
in particular contexts, offering only limited, fallible generalizations–yet having also
transformative power in regard to our view of science.
Writing a decade later, in reviewing the history of history and philosophy of sci-
ence (HPS) and the confrontations between the two disciplines, Schickore (2011)
takes up the argument between Burian and Pitt. She agrees with Pitt’s conclusion
that it is unjustified to generalize on the basis of one or a few episodes to wholesale
claims concerning science—adding that the same applies for attempts to discard any
such claims drawing only on a case or two (a genre that has been particularly vig-
orous in science and technology studies). What she does not believe in are attempts
at rescuing the case study methodology by using sets of longitudinal or compara-
tive case studies—an approach she attributes to Burian. Instead, Schickore thinks
that there is something fundamentally wrong in approaching philosophical analysis
in terms of the practice of natural science, which seeks to confront the theory with
evidence. According to such “confrontation model”, philosophy of science is devel-
oping a theory of science and the role of history of science is to provide data for
its confirmation or falsification. In contrast to this confrontation model, Schickore
advances a hermeneutical account that generates understanding of how scientific
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concepts, norms, and practices have developed. The hermeneutic circle of Schick-
ore’s proposal contains both historical and philosophical insights and allows the
modification of concepts through the work on historical cases.
Recently, Kinzel (2015) has portrayed this discussion by distinguishing between
the evidential and hermeneutic approaches.1 She points out, rightly we think, that
the confrontation model does not work in the natural sciences either, and so argues
for the evidential role of historical case studies. They are, according to her, capa-
ble of providing some evidential support for philosophical theorizing, provided that
their theory-laden narrative and constructed nature are properly understood. The
above short description of the discussion spawned by Pitt’s skepticism concerning
the philosophical use of historical case studies shows that the discussion has tended
to revolve around the issues concerning generality versus locality of the claims sup-
ported by case studies, and the hermeneutic versus evidential functions of historical
cases. In particular, it seems that all the participants of the debate (except perhaps
Burian) take it that the hermeneutic/narrative/theory-laden nature of historical case
studies limits their evidential role.2 But does this need to be the case? Is it possible
to conceive of historical (and empirical) case studies in a way that does not see the
interpretative, theory-laden nature of historical case studies as a limitation for their
evidential role for philosophical reasoning? In short, is it possible to conceive of
a particular philosophical way of using historical case studies that combines their
evidential-cum-theoretical nature? And how would such an account stand in terms
of the question concerning the general versus local nature of case-based reasoning?
In what follows, we will approach these questions through the examination of
three different philosophical case studies, one of which was authored by us. As
philosophers of science, having studied and presented several case studies (e.g.
Knuuttila (2006, 2013); Loettgers (2007); Knuuttila and Loettgers (2013, 2014)),
we will engage in this article in self-reflection of our own method presenting one of
our case studies (Knuuttila and Loettgers, 2015). Our endeavor is motivated by the
realization that the discussion on the use of historical case studies within philoso-
phy of science so far has largely proceeded on a rather general level. Consequently, a
more case-based investigation of the philosophical use of historical cases may seem
in order.
The three different case studies we will consider focus on modeling and on
the work of the Italian physicist and mathematician Vito Volterra—they all take
his version of the Lotka-Volterra model as a point of departure. The model is a
staple of philosophical discussion about mathematical modeling. What binds the
three case studies together is the fact that both our own discussion (Knuuttila and
Loettgers, 2015) and that of Scholl and Räz (2013) were written in part as responses
to Michael Weinberg’s (2007) influential “ ‘Who is a Modeler?’ ” In this article,
Weisberg contrasts Volterra’s version of the Lotka-Volterra to Mendeleev’s periodic
table claiming that of the two scientists only Volterra was a modeler. Weisberg then
1 Kinzel gives also Chang (2012) as an example of a proponent of a hermeneutic approach.
2 Some vestiges of the confrontation model seem to be at play here, even in the rejection of it.
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uses the contrast between Volterra’s and Mendeleev’s styles of theorizing to support
his claim that modeling is a distinct form of theorizing.
What is especially interesting about the three studies on Volterra’s modeling is
that all of them contrasted his work to that of another theoretician to deliver their
philosophical points. The contrasts used were different, however. Scholl and Räz
(2013) contrasted Volterra’s modeling to Darwin’s theory of the formation and dis-
tribution of coral atolls in the Pacific Ocean (also discussed by Weisberg (2007)). In
our work, we contrasted Volterra’s version of the Lotka-Volterra model to Lotka’s
version of it (Knuuttila and Loettgers, 2013). We suggested that the contrast between
Volterra and Lotka provides interesting material for evaluating Weisberg’s claims
concerning modeling since Weisberg only considered Volterra’s construction of the
Lotka-Volterra model. Our case studies showed that although Volterra and Lotka
presented models that, from a formal point of view, looked identical, they neverthe-
less followed different kinds of modeling strategies (Knuuttila and Loettgers, 2015).
In what follows, we will first discuss Michael Weisberg’s contrasting cases, turn-
ing then to Scholl and Räz’s (2013) article that makes use of a different contrast in
arguing against Weisberg’s position. Our own case study follows. In the discussion
and concluding chapter, we will contrast and compare the three different case studies
with each other, asking what kind of philosophical insight they offer, and how they
do it. In particular, we will suggest that the worries concerning the evidential role
of case studies, and their contextualization, are partially based on an inadequate un-
derstanding of how historical case studies are used in actual philosophical practice.
As philosophical discourses are often tied to conceptual analysis and development,
the evidential and hermeneutic roles are intertwined in case-based reasoning. Cases
are often studied in order to advance a philosophical argument, and in such use case
studies provide both evidence and interpretative resources for exploring and devel-
oping philosophical concepts and theories. In this work, various ways of expanding
the depth and coverage of the case-based argumentation may be used, one of which
is making use of the vehicle of contrasting different scientific cases.
1.2 Modeling as indirect representation
In his “ ‘Who is a Modeler?’ ” Michael Weisberg (2007) argues that many standard
philosophical accounts fail to distinguish between different forms of theorizing.
What he is interested in is articulating modeling as a distinct theoretical practice.
According to him, the goals, procedures, and representations employed by modelers
and other kinds of theorists differ. In particular, he distinguishes between two types
of theorizing: modeling and abstract direct representation. Modelers, according to
Weisberg, study real-world phenomena through the detour of creating hypothetical
simplified entities, models. That is, they practice the art of indirect representation.
In contrast, the theorists practicing abstract direct representation strive to represent
the data or real-world phenomena directly.
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The central philosophical thesis of “ ‘Who is a Modeler?’ ”revolves, then, around
the notion of indirect representation and the peculiar way models relate to real-
world phenomena. Models form a class of theoretical representations that are not
constructed by representing the real target systems. The consideration of the latter
first enters the process of modeling at a later stage that runs counter to the tra-
ditional representational idea of models as inherently models of some real target
systems.3 The claim that model construction happens before the possible real target
systems are being considered challenges the traditional understanding of models as
representations of some real-world target systems. Much of the scientific discussion
has (explicitly or implicitly) taken models as prototypical scientific representations
and proceeded to analyze the notion of representation through modeling (see, e.g.,
Bailer-Jones (2009); Contessa (2007); da Costa and French (2000); French and La-
dyman (1999); Frigg (2010); Giere (2004); Morgan and Morrison (1999); Maeki
(2009); Suárez (2008)). Weisberg departs from such assumptions in pointing out the
diversity of ways in which theoretical representations may be built, and related to
real world systems (see also Weisberg (2013)).
In making the distinction between modeling and abstract direct representation,
Weisberg redirects the focus from models to the activity of modeling. He proceeds in
three stages. Firstly, a model is being constructed, after which, secondly, the modeler
refines, analyses, and articulates its properties and dynamics. Only at the third stage,
the relationship between the model and any real-world target system is assessed, if
such an assessment is deemed necessary. Often modelers are predominantly inter-
ested in studying model systems themselves, and so the relationship between model
and any real-world target may be left implicit at best. This characteristic feature of
contemporary modeling practice tends to go unnoticed if models are understood in
the traditional representational fashion.
Interestingly, after characterizing abstract direct representation and modeling
in a preliminary fashion, Weisberg proceeds to analyze this distinction in a more
fine-grained manner making use of two cases. He contrasts Vito Volterra’s model-
ing style of theorizing from abstract direct representation as exhibited by Dimitri
Mendeleev’s periodic table. In his argument, Weisberg makes only use of Volterra’s
articles published in 1926 in Italian and English (Volterra, 1926a,b). According to
Weisberg, Volterra studied post-World War I fish populations in the Adriatic Sea
by ‘imagining a simple biological system composed of one population of predators
and one population of prey’ (Weisberg, 2007, p. 208). He attributed to this hypothet-
ical system only a few properties writing down a couple of differential equations to
describe their mutual dynamics. The word ‘imagining’ used by Weisberg captures
the difference between the procedures of direct and indirect representation. He un-
derlines that Volterra did not arrive at these model populations by abstracting away
from properties of real fish, but rather constructed them by stipulating certain of
their properties (Weisberg, 2007, p. 210). In contrast to Volterra, Weisberg claims,
Mendeleev built his Periodic Table through abstractions from data in order to iden-
tify some central factors of chemical behavior. Thus, in contrast to modelers con-
3 In recent discussion on modeling, the idea of models as fictions has been entertained by several
authors, e.g. Suárez (2008).
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structing hypothetical systems, he was trying to ‘represent trends in real chemical
reactivity, and not trends in a model system’ (Weisberg, 2007, p. 215, footnote 3).4
Both abstract direct representation and indirect representations abstract, approx-
imate, select, and idealize, so the difference between the two does not hang on these
procedures of scientific representation. What distinguishes modeling from abstract
direct representation is that it proceeds by describing another simpler, hypotheti-
cal system. Consequently, models should be considered independent objects in the
sense of being independent from some determinable real target systems.5 This im-
plies also an important difference on how one gains knowledge via modeling and
abstract direct representation. Namely, Weisberg claims that in abstract direct rep-
resentation ‘anything the theorist discovers in her analysis of the representation is
a discovery about the phenomenon itself, assuming that it was represented prop-
erly. There is no extra stage where the theorist must coordinate the model to a real
phenomenon’—as is the case with modeling (Weisberg, 2007, pp. 226–227). Al-
though it seems that Weisberg exaggerates the extent to which abstract direct rep-
resentation can allow the direct study of the phenomenon, yet such difference may
explain why the discussion on scientific representation has focused on modeling.
Models seem to provide the hard case that the various accounts of scientific repre-
sentation are designed to address.
As already mentioned, Weisberg’s account pays attention to the fact that models
are often studied quite apart from any representational relationships that they might
have to real-world systems. Moreover, many scientific models are far too simple
to be considered as models of some actual target systems, although they may bear
similarities to them. Secondly, scientists also study models of phenomena that are
not known to exist. If it is better understood why these phenomena do not exist, one
has also gained some understanding of the phenomena that do exist. In both of the
aforementioned situations, Weisberg claims that ‘it is clear that the model and only
the model is the object of study’ (Weisberg, 2007, p. 223).
While Weisberg’s thesis of modeling as indirect representation thus brings to the
fore some aspects of modeling largely neglected by the philosophical discussion
so far, the account seems lacking in some crucial respects. This becomes visible if
we examine how Weisberg thinks a modeler can be recognized: ‘To judge whether
or not a particular theorist is a modeler,’ argues Weisberg, ‘[w]e will actually need
to know something about how the theory was developed and how the modeler set
about trying to represent the world’ (Weisberg, 2007, p. 222). Let us consider, then,
what Weisberg says about how Volterra went about developing his version of the
Lotka-Volterra model:
4 Godfrey-Smith (2006) likewise distinguishes between indirect representation and abstract di-
rect representation—and invokes examples in trying to account for the difference between the two
strategies of theorizing. Godfrey-Smith studies two influential books on evolutionary theory: Leo
Buss’s The Evolution of Individuality (1987) and Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s The Major Tran-
sitions in Evolution (1995). Buss examines the ‘actual relations between cellular reproduction and
whole-organism reproduction in known organisms’ (Godfrey-Smith, 2006, p. 731), while Maynard
Smith and Szathmáry put forth ‘idealized, schematic causal mechanisms.’
5 On models as independent or autonomous entities, see also Morgan and Morrison (1999) and
Knuuttila (2005).
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Volterra began his investigation of Adriatic fish not by looking directly at these fish or
even the statistics gathered from the fish markets, but by constructing a model. This is
characteristic of the first stage of modeling. He imagined a population of predators and a
population of prey, each with only two properties. Setting this idea to paper, he wrote down
equations specifying the model that he had imagined. (Weisberg, 2007, p. 222, emphasis
added).
We find this a gross simplification of actual modeling practice and its reliance
on the already established computational methods and representational tools. In our
case study, we will study how Volterra and Lotka constructed their respective mod-
els. As we will argue, Volterra does not qualify as a prime example of a modeler,
since he pursued the essential or sufficient components of the real predator-prey sys-
tem. Although what he eventually accomplished suits Weisberg’s claims about mod-
eling, his original intentions were nonetheless different. Lotka provides a better ex-
ample of a modeler, but for reasons that are not discussed by Weisberg. Lotka started
from a systems theoretical perspective, developing a general model template, which
he applied to the analysis of biological and chemical systems. This kind of approach
is becoming prevalent in modeling complex systems. It does not start from imag-
ining simplified hypothetical systems (still somehow connected to some particular
real-world systems) but from applying cross-disciplinary computational templates
to various subject matters (cf. Humphreys (2002, 2004)). Before going into our case
studies, we will discuss the critique of the thesis of indirect representation by Scholl
and Räz (2013). They approach modeling in terms of ‘insufficient epistemic access’
and use as contrast cases Volterra and Darwin, a comparison already made by Weis-
berg (2007). However, Scholl and Räz are mainly referring to Volterra’s much later
work, co–authored with D’Ancona (Volterra and D’Ancona, 1935), whereas Weis-
berg relies exclusively on Volterra’s original articles from 1926 (Volterra (1926a,b)).
On our view, this may partially explain their different interpretations of Volterra.
1.3 Modeling is not about indirect representation
Although Weisberg launches the contrast between abstract direct representation
and indirect representation mainly in terms of the contrast between Volterra and
Mendeleev, later in his article he also discusses Darwin’s theory of the origin and
distribution of the coral reefs as an example of abstract direct representation (Weis-
berg, 2007, pp. 227–228). Scholl and Räz (2013) focus on the contrast between
Volterra’s and Darwin’s causal reasoning in their critique of Weisberg’s thesis of
indirect representation. Despite their critique, Scholl and Räz’s interpretation of
Volterra is also very much in line with what Weisberg claims. They point out that
according to Volterra and D’Ancona their “deductive approach” does not attempt
to “ ‘extract ecological laws directly from experimental data or observation.’ ” In-
stead, it proceeds on a “ ‘constructive path’ ” through hypotheses about basic causal
relationships, integrating them “ ‘into a system of interactions’ ” (Scholl and Räz,
2013, p. 120). Moreover, they adopt from Weisberg the distinction between dynam-
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ical and representational fidelity (see below). Where the two interpretations differ
most, is how Weisberg, on the one hand, and Scholl and Räz, on the other hand,
define modeling.
While Weisberg uses the contrast between Volterra’s,and Mendeleev’s (and Dar-
win’s) approaches to elucidate further his notion of modeling as indirect representa-
tion, Scholl and Räz extract their notion of modeling from Volterra and D’Ancona
(1935), arguing that Volterra and D’Ancona chose a modeling approach because di-
rect methods were not available for the problem they were studying. What would
have been the direct methods?6 Volterra and D’Ancona (1935) distinguish and dis-
cuss three different “‘direct’ ” methods. Each of the methods has their own limita-
tions when it comes to the studying of predator and prey dynamics. Firstly, there
is the experimental method of studying individual causes in isolation in controlled
conditions. Experiments on individual animals under laboratory conditions would
allow for causal inference, but ecologists study interactions of entire populations of
animals, making this approach deemed unsuitable by Volterra and D’Ancona. Con-
sequently, the second alternative would be to overcome this limitation by transfer-
ring the method of causal inference to ecology by performing breeding experiments
on entire populations.
In order to perform such controlled breeding experiments several requirements
have to be fulfilled: A space whose dimension has to be proportional to the size of
the animal is needed to run the experiment, and the length of the experiment has to
comply with the life expectations of the animals and their breeding cycles. Finally,
the environmental conditions would need to be controlled. Such experiments were
actually performed by the Russian biologist G. F. Gause (1935) who used micro-
organisms instead of fish. Micro-organisms have two important advantages: they do
not need a lot of space and have short generation times. Under controlled laboratory
conditions, Gause was able to explore how the prey micro–organisms developed in
isolation, and how the situation changed when the predator micro–organisms were
added. As promising as these experiments seemed to be to Volterra and D’Ancona,
they turned out not to be able to replicate the situation modeled by the Lotka-Volterra
model.
Finally, the third possibility considered by Volterra and D’Ancona, field exper-
iments, seemed infeasible because of the large number of uncontrollable factors
interfering with the population dynamics and would require intensive effort.
Based on the problems, or outright impossibility, of direct methods, Volterra and
D’Ancona then argue in favor for modeling, i.e. for their “ ‘deductive method.’ ”
This leads Scholl and Räz to conclude that it was precisely the “ ‘insufficient epis-
temic access’ ” that forced the two scientists to resign to a modeling approach. Such
an approach is described by the two authors as follows: “ ‘We begin with hypothe-
ses about basic causal relationships and integrate them into a system of interactions.
Then we check whether the constructed system, the model, is applicable to the tar-
get system’” (Scholl and Räz, 2013, p. 120). This procedure of constructing and
applying a hypothetical model is very similar to Weisberg’s indirect modeling ap-
6 We are here largely following the discussion by Scholl and Räz (2013).
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proach. However, they proceed to claim, in contrast to Weisberg, that Darwin faced
the same problem of insufficient epistemic access in his attempt to causally explain
the formation, origin, and distribution of coral reefs and atolls in the Pacific Ocean.
And so he was, by their criteria, also a modeler: “ ‘Darwin’s investigation has all the
hallmarks of model-based science ... The subsidence of islands and the growth of
corals occur over hundreds of thousands of years, distributed over the entire Pacific
Ocean, and so we can have no hope of directly investigating the process’ ” (ibid.,
127).
The starting point of Darwin’s modeling process was an island surrounded by
a fringing reef. According to his observations, corals prefer warm and shallow wa-
ters, surrounding volcano islands. In imagining the hypothetical model, Darwin pro-
ceeded from fringing reefs to barrier reefs. The formation of barrier reefs starts with
an island that sinks down. As a natural consequence also the corals will submerge
under the water and die. These dead corals provide the basis for new growing corals,
which will be now further away from the island because the island got smaller by
sinking down. If the island keeps subsiding the coral reef keeps growing on its own
foundation up the point where the island is completely under the water and forms
therefore a coral atoll. In such step-by-step, reasoning Darwin was able to ‘render
all the known forms of coral islands’ (ibid., 128).
The main difference between Volterra and D’Ancona and Darwin is not due to
the method of modeling, according to Scholl and Räz, but rather the fact that Darwin
was able to provide an “ ‘how actually’ ” model of the formation of coral reefs and
islands in contrast to the “ ‘how possibly’ ” models of Volterra and D’Ancona. Dar-
win’s account was able to “ ‘mirror’ ”—a not so fortunate choice of word by Scholl
and Räz—the causal structures of the target system, due to his careful observation of
the coral reef formation at its different stages. Scholl and Räz depict Darwin’s quest
from a “ ‘how possibly’ ” model, via empirical demonstration of the hypothesized
mechanism to adducing empirical evidence “ ‘in support of the claim that the model
faithfully represents the actual causal processes responsible for the growth of coral
atolls’ ” (ibid., 130). As a result, his model was representationally faithful instead
of succeeding only to reproduce empirical phenomena. Such dynamical fidelity was
what Volterra and D’Ancona were eventually only able to accomplish.
Although thus Weisberg as well as Scholl and Räz are largely in agreement on
their analysis of Volterra, they end up presenting his modeling exercise in differ-
ent terms. In what follows, we will argue, presenting yet another case study on
Volterra, that their disagreement can be partially settled by paying attention to the
fact that they make use of different writings of Volterra. Whereas Weisberg focuses
on the papers in which Volterra published his version of the Lotka-Volterra model
for the first time (Volterra, 1926a,b), Scholl and Räz discuss at length the work that
appeared nearly a decade later representing a mature state of a research program
inspired by the early papers of Volterra and D’Ancona (1935). Furthermore, using
Alfred Lotka’s very different design of the Lotka-Volterra model as a contrasting
case, we draw attention to the actual tools of modeling that both Weisberg as well as
Scholl and Räz have glossed over in their analysis. The differences between Volterra
and D’Ancona, and Darwin are to a large degree due to the fact that the former were
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engaged in mathematical modeling. Such theoretical activity is largely dependent
on mathematical tools and methods that are often interdisciplinary by their nature.7
1.4 The design of the Lotka-Volterra model by Volterra
Weisberg begins his story of the origin of the Lotka-Volterra model with the problem
presented by Umberto D’Ancona (1896–1964) to the world-renowned mathemati-
cal physicist Vito Volterra (1860–1940) in 1925. D’Ancona, a marine biologist and
Volterra’s son-in-law, had made a statistical study of the Adriatic fisheries over the
period 1905–1923. The data showed an unusual increase in predators during the
final period of the First World War and immediately after, when fishing was hin-
dered by the war. D’Ancona’s aim was to get mathematical support for the thesis
that cessation of fishing was favorable for predator fish. Thus Volterra set out to “
‘mathematically explain’ ” D’Ancona’s data on “ ‘temporal variations in the com-
position of species’ ” (Volterra, 1927, p. 68). He had no prior experience of fisheries,
yet this problem sparked his longer-term research program on the inter-species dy-
namics that culminated in Leçons sur la théorie mathématique de la lutte pour la
vie (Volterra, 1931) and Les associations biologiques au point de vue mathématique
(Volterra and D’Ancona, 1935). However, the way Volterra went about modeling
the predator-prey system can be traced further back in time.
1.4.1 Volterra and the mathematization of biology and social
sciences
Already decades before the formulation of the Lotka-Volterra model, Volterra was
interested in the mathematization of biology and social sciences. At the opening of
the academic year at the University of Rome in 1901, he delivered an Inaugural Ad-
dress entitled On the Attempts to Apply Mathematics to the Biological and Social
Sciences (Volterra, 1901). In this talk, Volterra spoke in favor of translating “ ‘natu-
ral phenomena into arithmetical or geometrical language’ ” and by doing so opening
“ ‘a new avenue for mathematics’ ” within biology and social sciences. An impor-
tant ingredient in this transformation process was provided by mechanics: biology
and social sciences should be mathematized according to the example provided by
mechanics. For Volterra it constituted “ ‘together with geometry, if not the most
brilliant then surely the most dependable and secure body of knowledge’ ” (ibid., p.
251).
On the other hand, physics at the beginning of the 20th century was ridden by
the apparent failure of the mechanistic world-view. This led Volterra to remark that
instead of the “ ‘illusions about giving a mechanical explanation of the universe’ ”
7 Our case studies are based on our earlier work (Knuuttila and Loettgers, 2015).
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one should “ ‘more modestly, [be] satisfied by analogy, and especially mathematical
analogy’ ” (Volterra, 1901, p. 255). He thought that a large part of mathematical
physics would still be usable, especially differential equations.8
The application of mathematics to social science and biology involved, for
Volterra, transforming qualitative elements into quantitative measurable elements,
measuring the variations, idealizing and abstracting the systems and processes under
investigation, representing them with differential calculus, and forming hypotheses
in the same fashion as in mechanics. The goal of idealization and abstraction was to
identify the ‘fundamental parameters’ governing the ‘change in the corresponding
variable elements of the phenomena’ (ibid., p. 255). Volterra saw in economics a
good example of a science modeled on mechanics:
The concept of Homo economicus, which has prompted so much discussion and provoked
such enormous difficulty that there are still those who refuse to accept it, comes so naturally
to our mechanist that he is surprised at the suspicions aroused by this abstract, schematic
being. He sees in Homo economicus a concept similar to those that, by long habit, have
become familiar to him. He is used to idealizing surfaces as frictionless, wires as inexten-
sible, solids as undeformable, and to substituting perfect liquids and gases for the natural
kind. Not only has he made a habit of all this, but he also knows the advantages of doing so.
(Volterra, 1901, p. 252).
Yet it appears contradictory to transfer the modeling methods and concepts of
mechanics to another entirely different areas of study and strive, simultaneously, to
capture the fundamental factors behind the phenomena in question. Is there a reason
to suppose that the mechanical approach works in such fields as biology, or social
sciences, taking into account the complexity of the phenomena they study? As we
will show in the next section, this was precisely the reason why Volterra had to resort
to ‘the method of hypothesis’ in modeling biological associations.
1.4.2 Volterra’s method of hypothesis
According to his methodological ideals, Volterra embarked on accounting for D’An-
cona’s statistical data by “ ‘isolating those factors one wishes to examine, assuming
they act alone, and by neglecting others’ ” (Volterra, 1927, p. 67). First, he distin-
guished between “ ‘external’ ” and “ ‘internal’ ” causes. External causes were “
‘periodic circumstances relating to the environment, as would be those, for exam-
ple, which depend upon the changing of the seasons, which produce oscillations
of an external character in the number of the individuals of the various species’ ”
(Volterra, 1928, p. 5). Volterra was focusing on internal causes that had “ ‘periods
of their own which add their action to these external causes and would exist even
if these were withdrawn’ ” (ibid.). However, this was just a starting point for him
since already at the beginning he had a larger picture in mind. He went on to model
8 Volterra had started his scientific career as a mathematician and had made important contributions
to the theory of calculus. This work is summarized in Volterra’s book Theory of Functionals and
of Integral and Integro-Differential Equations (Volterra, 1930).
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more complicated cases, adding also some effects of the environment. The Lotka-
Volterra model was merely one of the basic models of biological associations with
which Volterra referred to stable associations that “ ‘are established by many species
which live in the same environment’ ” (Volterra, 1928, p. 4). In the paper in which
he presents the Lotka-Volterra model for the first time (Volterra, 1926b, 1928),9 he
begins from a consideration of one species alone and then adds other species. The
first association he models is that between two species which contend for the same
supply of food. After that he formulated the Lotka-Volterra model on two species,
one of which feeds upon the other.
Although Volterra strove to separate external and internal causes, he admitted
that they could be interrelated in a myriad of ways. Interacting species in a chang-
ing environment constitutes a problem of a much higher degree of complexity than
the systems studied in classical mechanics. The mathematical methods and tech-
niques of mechanics could not be applied off-hand to the study of the predator-prey
dynamics. Even if the variations observed in populations living in the same en-
vironment showed some well-known characteristics observed in many mechanical
systems, such as oscillatory behavior, it was unclear, which were the components of
the system and in which ways they interacted. Consequently, Volterra faced the fol-
lowing dilemma: On the one hand, the complexity of the system had to be rendered
manageable, enabling the use of certain mathematical tools. On the other hand, the
available mathematical tools and methods exhibited a serious constraint on the kinds
of structures and processes that could be studied. Volterra reflected on this situation
in the following way:
But on the first appearance it would seem as though on account of its extreme complexity the
question might not lend itself to a mathematical treatment, and that on the contrary mathe-
matical methods, being too delicate, might emphasize some peculiarities and obscure some
essentials of the question. To guard against this danger we must start from the hypothe-
ses, even though they be rough and simple, and give some scheme for the phenomenon.
(Volterra, 1928, p. 5, emphasis added)
Since he could not isolate internal causes from external causes, due to the com-
plexity of the interactions between the components of the system of interest, he
constructed a hypothetical system with the help of certain assumptions concerning
them. Some of these assumptions were directly due to the application of differential
calculus to the problem of predation (see also our discussion on the method of iso-
lation in section 5.1). The central assumptions made in the construction process of
the model were:
• The numbers of species increase or decrease in a continuous way, which makes
them describable by means of differential equations.
• Birth takes place continuously and is not restricted to seasons. The birth-rate is
proportional to the number of living individuals of the species. The same assump-
tion is made for the death rate.
9 (Volterra, 1928) is a partial English translation of the Italian original (Volterra, 1926b); in the
following, references are made to the 1928 translation.
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• Homogeneity of the individuals of each species, which neglects the variations of
age and size.
Thus Volterra concentrated exclusively on the dynamics between predators and
preys by formulating a simplified hypothetical system consisting solely of “ ‘the
intrinsic phenomena’ ” due to the voracity and fertility of the co-existing species’
(Volterra, 1927, p. 68). This strategy of “ ‘starting from the hypotheses’ ” allowed
Volterra to apply well-known mathematical tools and methods to the study of bio-
logical associations.
1.4.3 The construction of the Lotka-Volterra model by Volterra
In deriving the Lotka-Volterra equations, Volterra started out from a situation in
which each of the species is alone. In this situation, he assumed, the prey would
grow exponentially and the predator in turn would decrease exponentially, because
of missing food resources. Translated into the language of mathematics, the devel-
opment of prey and predator populations is described by the following two differ-








where e1,e2 > 0 are constants. Integration of the two differential equations leads
to an exponential increase of the prey and an exponential decrease of the predator
population, with Ni,0 referring to the numbers of individuals at time 0.
N1(t) = N1,0ee1t , N2(t) = N2,0e e2t . (1.2)
Exponential growth or decrease is the simplest way of describing the development
of a population in time. It does not take into account any environmental influences
or the obvious fact that there is must be an upper limit of the population sustainable
by the resources provided by the environment. To allow for the interaction between
prey and predator populations, Volterra introduced a coupling term in each equa-




= (e1   g1N2)N1, (1.3)
dN2
dt
= ( e2 + g2N1)N2. (1.4)
The interaction between predator and prey is now described by the terms involving
the product N1N2, which introduces a non-linearity into the system in addition to
the coupling of the two differential equations. The proportionality constant g1 links
14 Tarja Knuuttila and Andrea Loettgers
the prey mortality to the number of prey and predators, and the constant g2 links
the increase in predators to the number of prey and predators. One of the possible
solutions to these coupled non-linear differential equations is an oscillation in the
numbers of predator and prey. Concerning those oscillating solutions Volterra wrote:
From the analytical viewpoint, it is to be noted that the study of fluctuations or oscillations of
the number of individuals of species living together, [...] falls outside the ordinary study of
oscillations, because in these researches we had to deal generally with non-linear equations,
whereas the classical study of the theory of oscillations involves linear equations. (Volterra,
1928, p. 23)
The mathematical analysis of the resulting equations gave Volterra some impor-
tant results—including a solution to D’Ancona’s problem concerning the relative
abundance of predatory fish during the war years. Volterra summarized his results
in what he called the ‘three fundamental laws of the fluctuations of the two species
living together’ (Volterra, 1928, p. 20). The third law states that if an attempt were
made to destroy the individuals of the predator and prey species uniformly and in
proportion to their number, the average number of the prey would increase and the
average number of the predator would decrease.10 As regards fisheries, this “ ‘law’ ”
was anticipated already by E. Ray Lancaster (1884).11 Volterra himself quoted Dar-
win: “ ‘If not one head of game were shot during the next twenty years in England,
and at the same time no vermin were destroyed, there would in all probability be
less game than at present, although hundreds of thousands of game animals are now
annually shot’ ” (Volterra, 1926a, p. 559); (Darwin, 1882, pp. 53–54). For Volterra
his long-term research on “ ‘biological associations’ ” was a contribution to the Dar-
winian theory of struggle for existence (see Volterra (1931); Volterra and D’Ancona
(1935)).12
To appreciate the importance of mechanical analogies in the construction of
Volterra’s model one can, firstly, consider the way he treated predation. He assumed
that the increase and decrease of predator and prey populations (Eqs. 1.3, 1.4) are
linear with respect to the product of N1 and N2, i.e. g1 and g2 are constants. To jus-
tify this assumption Volterra drew an analogy to mechanics by using the so-called
“ ‘method of encounters’ ” according to which the number of collisions between
the particles of two gases is proportional to the product of their densities.13 Thus
Volterra assumed that the rate of predation upon the prey is proportional to the prod-
uct of the numbers of the two species.
Secondly, in generalizing his account to take into consideration the different
kinds of interactions and multiple species, Volterra utilized mechanical analogies
in various ways (e.g. Volterra (1926a, 1927, 1931)). For instance, making use of
the concept of friction in mechanics he made a distinction between two types of
10 For this so-called Volterra principle, see Weisberg and Reisman (2008).
11 Lankester suggested that to protect edible prey-fish their enemies should be destroyed in the
same proportion as the adult prey fish were ‘removed’ (Lancaster, 1884, p. 416).
12 On Volterra’s Darwinism, see Scudo (1992).
13 Volterra made use of the method of encounters also in his study of the demographic evolution
of a single species: There he applied the method of encounters to mating.
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biological associations, conservative and dissipative ones (Volterra, 1926a, 1927).
Conservative systems are analogous to frictionless systems in mechanics. In con-
servative associations, the oscillations produced by the interactions of the species
remain constant like in the Lotka-Volterra model. In dissipative associations, the
fluctuations of the species are damped due to the friction caused by the interaction
between individuals of the same species (which takes into account the effects of
a population’s size on its own growth). These cases display a parallel to the cases
of damped and undamped harmonic oscillator in mechanics. Although conservative
associations have very appealing mathematical properties, Volterra thought that dis-
sipative associations are more realistic approximations of the natural situation than
the conservative ones (Volterra, 1928, p. 47).
The tension between applying the concepts and mathematical techniques sug-
gested by classical mechanics and the aim to construct more realistic models marked
Volterra’s long research program on biological associations. He spent the rest of his
life, more than a decade, formulating more elaborate models, taking into account
different kinds of associations and situations, and making extensive use of modeling
methods borrowed from mechanics. Already in his original 1926 article (Volterra,
1926b), he also considered the cases of any number of species which either con-
tended for the same food or some of which fed upon the others. One year after the
publication of the original Italian article, Volterra (1927) also introduced integro-
differential equations in an attempt to take into account the delayed effects of feed-
ing on reproduction.14 Finally, in a group of papers published in 1936 and 1937,
Volterra made use of the calculus of variations in an attempt to provide a synthesis
of his theory of biological associations along the lines of analytical mechanics. It is
worth citing at length his explanation of this agenda:
The second part [of Principes de biologie mathématique] begins with a conservation of de-
mographic energy, according to which there are two sorts of energy, one actual and one
potential, which transform mutually the one into the other. The principle is the analogue
of the principle of conservation of mechanical energy. It is followed by the enunciation of
the three laws relating to the biological fluctuations, the experimental verification of which
has been investigated by several naturalists. The success, which has attended their efforts is
well known.
Everybody knows the importance of Hamilton’s principle in mechanics and in all the do-
mains of physical science. An analogous variation principle can be found in biology, and
from it one can deduce the fluctuation equations in the canonical Hamiltonian form and also
in the form of a Jacobian partial differential equation. [. . . ]
Hamilton’s principle leads to the principle of least action (Maupertuis). There exists also in
biology a closely related principle, which may be called the principle of least vital action.
Its analytical form is such that it requires the existence of a true minimum, a state of affairs
which does not always hold good in the analogous case in mechanics. (Volterra, 1937b,
p. 35)15.
The reference to the experimental verification in the quotation above is impor-
tant. Being faithful to his earlier methodological pronouncements, Volterra was also
14 Today Volterra is mostly known for the Lotka-Volterra equation. For a discussion on how
Volterra’s various models anticipated several theoretical advances in theoretical ecology, see Scudo
(1971).
15 A partial English translation of this paper can be found in (Scudo and Ziegler, 1978).
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interested in testing his theories on empirical data, although he typically kept the
mathematical, technical treatments and the empirical accounts separate from each
other.16 Apart from his collaboration with D’Ancona, he was also engaged in ac-
tive correspondence with other biologists and scientists that served as an attempt for
him to verify his theoretical findings empirically (see Israel and Gasca (2002)).17
Volterra rejected the idea of formulating mathematical models that could not be
tested empirically and he insisted that all the variables introduced in the mathemat-
ical formalizations should be measurable. This eventually led him into a disagree-
ment with D’Ancona, who was skeptical of Volterra’s quest for empirical valida-
tion. He argued that Volterra’s models were rather interesting theoretical working
hypotheses able to stand on their own (see Israel (1991, 1993)). Volterra’s prefer-
ence of grounding hypotheses in empirical research is displayed also by his reply
to Alfred Lotka (Israel and Gasca, 2002). Lotka had claimed priority for the Lotka-
Volterra model on the basis of his Elements of Physical Biology (1925) published in
1925. Volterra (1927) acknowledged Lotka’s priority, but stressed that he had formu-
lated principles concerning “ ‘sea-fisheries,’ ” implying that this was not what Lotka
had focused on. Indeed, Lotka derived his version of the Lotka-Volterra model in an
entirely different way than Volterra. His approach is in a sense more contemporary
than that of Volterra’s, pointing towards complex systems theory and its use across
the disciplines.
1.5 The design of the Lotka-Volterra model by Lotka
In contrast to Vito Volterra, the other author of the Lotka-Volterra model, Alfred
Lotka (1880–1949), struggled to gain recognition for his work from the scientific
community throughout his life. In addition to being a mathematician and statistician
he had a background in physics, physical chemistry, and biology. In his work, Lotka
integrated concepts, methods, and techniques from those various fields, develop-
ing a modeling approach that could be characterized as a precursor for a systems
approach. The developers of general systems theory and cybernetics, Ludwig von
Bertalanffy (1968) and Norbert Wiener (1948), were inspired by Lotka’s work, es-
pecially his book Elements of Physical Biology (1925). Herbert Simon characterized
Lotka ‘as a forerunner whose imagination creates plans of exploration that he can
only partly execute, but who exerts great influence on the work of his successors’
(Simon, 1981, p. 493). For Simon, Lotka’s book provided insight into how mathe-
16 For example in Volterra (1936) and Volterra (1937a) he discussed the connection between his
theories and biological data.
17 The biologists with whom Volterra corresponded included Georgii F. Gause, R. N. Chapman,
Jean Régnier, Raymond Pearl, Karl Pearson, D’Arcy W. Thompson, William R. Thompson, Alfred
J. Lotka, and Vladimir A. Kostitzin. The correspondence of Vito Volterra on mathematical biology
also provides interesting material as regards modeling methods. Among other things, it provides
material on the choices between deterministic and probabilistic approaches; between continuous
and discrete models; between closed-form solutions and numerical solutions, and between quali-
tative and quantitative models.
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matics could be fruitfully applied in the social sciences. Lotka is also regarded as
the founder of mathematical demography, and exerted a great influence on ecolo-
gist Eugene P. Odum, who counts as the founder of systems ecology. As the above
discussion on Lotka’s influence on the development of various systems theoretic
approaches already hints at, his design of the Lotka-Volterra model was opposite
to that of Volterra. Instead of starting from different simple cases and generalizing
from them, he developed a highly abstract and general model template that could be
applied to modeling various kinds of systems.
1.5.1 Physical biology according to Lotka
Lotka aimed at developing a “ ‘physical biology,’ ” employing “ ‘physical principles
and methods in the contemplation of biological systems’ ” (Lotka, 1925, p. viii). He
was, however, skeptical of applying the most idealized cases of mechanics to bio-
logical systems. His main focus was on the evolution of biological systems, which
he defined as follows: ‘Evolution is the history of a system undergoing irreversible
changes’ (Lotka, 1925, p. 49). This definition does not exclude reversible processes,
although Lotka argued that all real processes are irreversible. Reversible processes
were for him idealizations. The evolution of a system in time is characterized, ac-
cording to Lotka, by an increase in entropy. Physical biology was in turn “ ‘a branch
of the greater discipline of the General Mechanics of Evolution’ ” (ibid.).
Another important impulse for Lotka’s program of physical biology came from
the success of physical chemistry by the end of the 19th century (Servos, 1990).
Physical chemistry functioned as a model science for Lotka in much the same way
as mechanics did for Volterra. Based on the conviction “ ‘that the principles of ther-
modynamics or of statistical mechanics do actually control the processes occurring
in systems in the course of organic evolution’ ” (Lotka, 1925, p. 39), Lotka set out to
apply the methods, techniques, and concepts from thermodynamics and statistical
physics to the study of the evolution of biological systems. He realized, however,
that biological systems are too complex to allow any straightforward application of
thermodynamics. Lotka attempted to overcome this problem by introducing a gen-
eralized approach, which can be best understood as a kind of systems approach. The
model later dubbed as the Lotka-Volterra model was just one application of Lotka’s
systems approach.
Apart from mechanics and physical chemistry, also the field of energetics had an
impact on Lotka’s theorizing. Energetics as a specific theoretical field originated in
the 19th century in the works of Georg Helm (1898) and Wilhelm Ostwald (1893)
and others. It aimed at the development of a generalized theory based on the con-
cept of energy. In a broader context, the movement can be understood as a reaction
against the mechanistic world-view. In addition to being one of the main spokes-
men of energetics, Ostwald (1893) was also one of the founding fathers of physical
chemistry. From energetics Lotka took the idea of conceptualizing the components
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of systems as energy transformers in an analogy to heat engines (energy transform-
ers could be organisms, chemical elements, etc.).
Energy transformers and the processes linked to them constituted what Lotka
called the Micro-Mechanics of a system. Macro-Mechanics on the other hand en-
compassed the redistribution of mass between the components of the system. This
distinction is similar to thermodynamics and statistical mechanics where, accord-
ing to Lotka, the Macro-Mechanics examines the “ ‘phenomena displayed by the
component aggregates in bulk’ ”, and the Micro-Mechanics “ ‘is centered primar-
ily upon the phenomena displayed by the individuals of which the aggregates are
composed’ ” (Lotka, 1925, p. 50). Thus Lotka attempted, at the same time, to ap-
ply thermodynamics and statistical mechanics to biology and to formulate a general
approach that could overcome the problems inherent in drawing direct analogies
between different disciplines—as Volterra had done.
1.5.2 Lotka’s systems approach and the Lotka-Volterra model
In his version of the Lotka-Volterra model, the model concerned macro-level phe-
nomena. In order to describe the general dynamics on the macro level, Lotka started
out from the law of mass action used in chemistry to describe the behavior of
solutions. Lotka introduced the law by using the example of a system consisting
of 4 gram-molecules of hydrogen, 2 gram-molecules of oxygen, and 100 gram-
molecules of steam, at one atmosphere pressure, and a tempreature of 1800o C. The












where v is the volume, m1 is the mass of steam, m2 the mass of hydrogen, and m3
the mass of oxygen. The coefficients k1 and k2 are characteristic parameters of the
reaction such as temperature and pressure. Lotka was not interested in this particular
equation but in the more general statement implied by the equation according to
which “ ‘the rate of increase in mass, the velocity of growth of one component,
steam (mass m1), is a function of the masses m2 and m3, as well as of the mass m1
itself, and of the parameters v (volume) and T (temperature)’“ (Lotka, 1925, p. 42).
He then went on to write the equation in a more general form:
dXi
dt
= Fi(X1,X2, .., .Xn;P,Q). (1.6)
This equation describes evolution as a process of redistribution of matter among the
several components Xi of the system. Lotka called this equation the “ ‘Fundamental
Equation of Kinetics’“ where the function F describes the physical interdependence
of the several components. P and Q are parameters of the system. Q defines, in the
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case of biological systems, the characters of the species variable in time and P the
geometrical constraints of the system such as volume, area, and extension in space.
Lotka had introduced this general approach in two articles published already 5
years before Elements of Physical Biology appeared in print. Interestingly, in both
of these articles there appears a pair of equations that has the same form as what
Volterra independently arrived at some years later. The first of these was entitled “
‘Analytical note on certain rhythmic relations in organic systems’“ (Lotka, 1920a)
and the second paper “ ‘Undamped oscillations derived from the law of mass ac-
tions’ “ (Lotka, 1920b). In the first of the papers, the equations are applied to the
analysis of a biological system, and in the second paper they are applied to a chemi-
cal system.18 The title of the second paper refers explicitly to the law of mass action.
In contrast to Volterra, who first considered the simplest models of interaction and
then generalized the results to any number of species, Lotka started out from very
general considerations and only after he had formulated his general equation did he
turn to specific cases, such as the Lotka-Volterra model.
A further, important element in Lotka’s design of the Lotka-Volterra model were
the methods he introduced to analyze and calculate the dynamic behavior of the
systems he had described. Having formulated the fundamental equation of kinetics,
Lotka showed that without knowing the precise form of the function describing the
interaction between the components, the properties related to the steady states of
the system can already be studied. Lotka assumed that both the environment and the
genetic constitutions are constant, after which, by means of a Taylor series expan-
sion, he calculated the possible stationary states of the system. He was able to show
that, in general, the system will exhibit one of the following three behaviors with in-
creasing time: First, the system asymptotically approaches an equilibrium; second,
it performs irregular oscillations around an equilibrium; or third, it performs regular
oscillations around the equilibrium. He then applied the fundamental equation to




= (e1   g1N2)N1, (1.7)
dN2
dt
= ( e2 + g2N1)N2, (1.8)
which are the same as Volterra’s equations. They constitute a set of non-linear cou-
pled first-order differential equations, which cannot be solved analytically. There-
fore, Lotka’s general method of calculating the stationary states became a valuable
tool for dealing with such sets of coupled differential equations. As already men-
tioned, he claimed priority for the model on the basis of his Elements of Physical
Biology (1925). The reason for this might be that in (Lotka, 1920a) he draws the
Lotka-Volterra equations from his general equation inspired by chemical dynamics
18 Lotka dealt with the rhythmic effects of chemical reactions already in his earlier writings, see
e.g. Lotka (1910)
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without any discussion of empirical biological systems. In Elements of Physical Bi-
ology he applies the equations to the study of a host-parasite system, citing also W.
R. Thomson (1922) and L. O. Howard (1897) on this topic. In the third part of the
book, the fundamental kinetic equation is also used to study various other cases,
such as the spreading of malaria.
As was the case with Volterra, also Lotka’s program went much further than the
development of what became known as the Lotka-Volterra model. In fact, his vi-
sions went far beyond ecology. His book Elements of Physical Biology is a unique
conceptualization of the manifold biological, physical, and chemical processes and
their complex interactions in the world surrounding us. The organic world becomes
a giant energy transformer in which the general kinetic equations provide the math-
ematical tool for describing the distribution and the transfer of energy between the
components of the world. Biological systems, according to Lotka’s vision, were to
be treated identically with physical systems: it all boiled down to the study of trans-
formations of matter and energy.
1.6 Discussion
Lotka and Volterra worked along the same lines, taking inspiration of physical
sciences in modeling biological systems, and eventually they presented the same
model. Yet they arrived there following different kinds of modeling strategies. While
Volterra was making repeatedly use of analogies taken from physical sciences,
Lotka was more wary of this kind of procedure and adopted instead a more gen-
eral, template-based approach. He did not set out to explain some specific dynamics
associated with, for example, the spreading of malaria. He focused on more general
characteristics of evolving systems, which he defined as follows:
[. . . ] an evolving system is an aggregation of numbered or measured components of several
specified kinds, and which observes and registers the history of that system as a record
of progressive changes taking place in the distribution, among those components, of the
material of which the system is built up. (Lotka, 1925, p. 41)
The template Lotka constructed is a mathematized form of this description of
evolving systems. All systems, which show some kind of dynamics, should in prin-
ciple be describable by means of the template. Such analysis would not be restricted
to certain species or populations, but concerned various kinds of transformer types,
organic and inorganic.
This difference in the respective modeling strategies of Lotka and Volterra has
profound implications concerning the interpretation of their versions of the Lotka-
Volterra model. Volterra approached modeling from the perspective of the causal
explanation of real mechanisms, presenting his model in terms of fully specified
equations governing the dynamics of the system in question. This approach enables
the ecological interpretation of the coefficients, but simultaneously makes it a gross
simplification of the biological reality. Lotka’s formulation recognizes the implausi-
bility of completely specifying the full functional forms of the equations governing
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an ecological system, or any other complex system, for that matter. Within a local
neighborhood of an equilibrium, the full equations are approximated by the Taylor
series expansion (see Haydon and Lloyd (1999, p. 205–206)).
Having elucidated the historical roots of the Lotka-Volterra model, we will now
turn to the philosophical discussion on Volterra and modeling. Let us recall that both
Weisberg (2007) as well as Scholl and Räz (2013) considered Volterra as a modeler,
but on different grounds. Much of what they say on Volterra’s theoretical approach
is congruent, however, even though they make use of different parts of his work.
Weisberg relies exclusively on Volterra’s (1926a; 1926b) original publications in
Italian and English. Although Scholl and Räz refer to Volterra’s early (1926a; 1928)
publications, they draw most heavily on the arguments presented in his later work
co-authored by D’Ancona (Volterra and D’Ancona, 1935). As we have shown, as
Volterra’s research program on the biological associations progressed, he started to
pay more and more attention to the empirical verification of his models. Thus the
somewhat different takes on Volterra’s work by Weisberg and Scholl and Räz can
be partly explained by their focus on the different phases of his work.
Where Weisberg’s and Scholl and Räz’s studies part concerns not so much
Volterra’s actual claims, but rather the more philosophical question of whether
Volterra’s method of hypothesis can be considered to represent a unique style of
theorizing (that Weisberg calls modeling). While Weisberg seems to be working
with an already established intuition of modeling that he then chooses to exemplify
by contrasting Volterra with Mendeleev and Darwin, the focus of Scholl and Räz is
on causal inference. They derive their working notion of modeling as arising from
the insufficient epistemic access from the later writings of Volterra (Volterra and
D’Ancona 1935) without any explicit attention to the philosophical discussion on
modeling.19 This differs from Weisberg’s treatment. He does, after discussing the
different case studies, explicate at length what kind of features “ ‘an account of
models adequate for characterizing the practice of modeling must have’ ” (Weis-
berg, 2007, p. 221).
It is noteworthy that apart from agreeing with Weisberg about the indirect nature
of Volterra’s theoretical endeavour, Scholl and Räz adopt, furthermore, his distinc-
tion between representational and dynamical fidelity. What their criticism eventu-
ally boils down to, is to showing how Darwin succeeded in what Volterra did not:
establishing a “ ‘trajectory from “ ‘how possibly’ ” (dynamical fidelity without rep-
resentational fidelity) to “ ‘how actually’ ” (dynamical fidelity and representational
fidelity)’ ” (Scholl and Räz, 2013, p. 131).20 For Scholl and Räz, then, modeling
19 Our reading of Scholl and Räz (2013) differs somewhat from their later reading of their own
article (this volume). In their original article, they do not clearly offer causal inference as a con-
trast to modeling (that would provide an alternative for Weisberg’s contrast between modeling and
abstract direct representation). According to them “ ‘much of our discussion will focus on models
of causal structures’ ” (Scholl and Räz, 2013, p. 117, emphasis added). Their earlier focus was on
causal inference in general and modeling a strategy to deal with insufficient epistemic success.
20 Scholl and Räz adopt the distinction between ‘how possibly’ and ‘how actually’ from the dis-
cussion on mechanistic explanation (Machamer et al., 2000), a discussion that has been up until
recently relatively disinterested in modeling and that considered models as explanation sketches
only (see Knuuttila and Loettgers (2013)).
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does not need to stay at the level of indirect reasoning and production of only dy-
namically accurate models, and so indirect representation needs not to be the mark
of modeling. Yet Weisberg would not necessarily disagree with them. His thesis
concerns the way the model is developed, that is, the indirect strategy of represent-
ing a hypothetical system. In that stage, the dynamical fidelity may function as the
most important guide. But it does not mean that models could not be developed
into representationally more accurate descriptions of actual target systems. That is
what Volterra (and D’Ancona) attempted, to some degree. So there seems not to be
too big a difference between Weisberg’s and Scholl and Räz’s claims concerning
Volterra’s work and modeling.
Scholl and Räz (this volume) seem to be willing to render the contrast between
their and Weisberg’s account clearer by claiming that Volterra and D’Ancona “
‘write that for their own investigation they would have preferred an experimental ap-
proach, which would have allowed for direct causal inferences in the system under
scrutiny.’ ” We find it doubtful that a world-renowned mathematician and theoreti-
cal physicist, whose outspoken goal was to mathematize social science and biology
would have preferred the experimental approach.
In our view it is more likely that Volterra and D’Ancona’s discussion of the ra-
tionale of their mathematical approach is due to Volterra’s methodological views
according to which the empirical verification of theories was important—indicating
that Volterra cannot be conceived as a modeller making use of a purposeful strat-
egy of indirect representation. Yet, at retrospect, what Volterra eventually accom-
plished can be approached as an instance of modeling despite his methodological
pronouncements. As we discussed in our case study, Volterra’s primary aim, already
expressed in his Inaugural Address (Volterra, 1901) was to isolate the “ ‘fundamen-
tal parameters’ ” of the predator-prey system. In actual practice he started right away
from certain assumed factors and from the hypothesis that the oscillations in the fish-
ery data might be accounted for solely by these factors and the resulting interaction
of the two species.
From our point of view, the crucial question concerns the reasons as to why
Volterra (and D’Ancona) did not achieve more representationally accurate mod-
els? Was there something about their method that sets it apart from Darwin’s and
Mendeleev’s achievements? We think that there is a more profound reason for why
Volterra adopted an indirect modeling strategy that neither Weisberg, nor Scholl and
Räz discuss. Namely, as we showed through our case study, Volterra was interested
in the mathematization of biology and social sciences, and in utilizing the tools and
methods of mechanics in this task. The way he proceeded to model biological as-
sociations made heavy use of analogies to mechanics that enabled him to transfer
mathematical tools and methods of physics to biology. The strategy of constructing
a simpler hypothetical system to which only some properties are assigned is due to
the goal of mathematizing the problem at hand. Such method had proven successful
within physics, but Volterra was only too aware of the complexity of the problem
posed by biological associations in a natural environment with various kinds of per-
turbations. The dynamical fidelity was important to Volterra precisely since his was
an attempt of explaining the oscillations only by internal causes, i.e. solely by the
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interaction between the two species. A major part of contemporary mathematical
modeling across different disciplines is precisely providing these kinds of hypo-
thetical explanations.21 In (Knuuttila and Loettgers, 2015) we argue that methods-
drivenness and outcome-orientedness are characteristic features of such modeling
exercises.
Yet, as our study concerning the different designs of the Lotka-Volterra model
shows, modeling is nevertheless not any unitary theoretical strategy, as Weisberg
seems to be claiming. Lotka’s strategy for using the model templates22 drawn from
statistical mechanics and physical chemistry was different from that of Volterra’s.
For Lotka the general systems approach he developed provided the justification for
his modeling approach. As we have discussed, his approach anticipates many con-
temporary modeling practices in which the model templates developed in complex
systems theory are applied across the variety of disciplines, studying both natural
and social systems. Interestingly, in the context of the study of complex systems, the
Lotka-Volterra model was “ ‘rediscovered’ ” as one of the basic simple models that
afforded the study of complex systems (e.g. May (1974)).
1.7 Conclusion: Theoretical case-based philosophical practice
How do philosophers of science make use of historical case studies? In particu-
lar, are their accounts of historical cases necessarily purpose-built and lacking in
evidential strength as a result of putting forth and discussing philosophical posi-
tions? In order to find this out, we have examined three different philosophical case
studies on Vito Volterra’s work, one of which is our own. The interesting outcome
of this exercise is that while the philosophical conclusions of the three case stud-
ies are different, they largely agree on their interpretation of Volterra’s work! The
comparison of these case studies discussed (by Weisberg (2007), Scholl and Räz
(2013), and Knuuttila and Loettgers (2015)) does not lend credence to the idea that
they argue for their philosophical claims by simply confronting them with histor-
ical cases—or constructing the cases according to their preferred theory (cf. Pitt
(2001)). Does this mean that historical case studies in philosophy of science should
be understood as interpretative activity investigating scientific concepts, norms and
practices, as Schickore has suggested? Our answer to this question is positive, but
we do not see that it would need to imply either rejecting the evidential role of case
studies (cf. Schickore (2011)), or compromising, or lessening, their evidential value
(cf. Kinzel (2015)). In our view, philosophers of science usually use case studies as
vehicles of theoretical reflection, as resources in examining, questioning, and devel-
21 The “ ‘how-possible’ ” may be a bit misleading expression in this context, since what Volterra
accomplished was an alternative explanation for the prevailing explanations that attributed the
fluctuations to external causes.
22 A model template is an abstract conceptual idea concerning usually a certain kind of interaction
and associated with particular mathematical forms and computational methods, see for further
discussion Knuuttila and Loettgers (2014).
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oping philosophical concepts and accounts. In that use evidential and hermeneutic
roles go hand in hand, informing each other. Thus the three case studies presented
in this paper serve as examples of case-based theoretical philosophical practice that
is underlined by the way each of them uses the strategy of contrasting partially sim-
ilar, and partially different scientific examples. The use of the contrasting example
highlights the conceptual distinctions made.
How should one, then, understand the philosophical case-based theoretical prac-
tice? The first thing to notice is that it is difficult to recognize it, if one approaches
philosophy as an activity that aims only at a general/rational reconstruction of sci-
entific activity (although that would also need historical and empirical knowledge,
if only to recognize what constitutes, in fact, successful science). It seems that this
kind of conception of the philosophy of science lies behind the various iterations
of the claims that scientific case studies cannot give evidential support for philo-
sophical positions. But clearly, philosophical theorizing also contains an important
descriptive component as well as being often more local and tentative in nature – as
the practice-oriented philosophy of science has recently shown.
If one looks at the use of historical case studies as vehicles for philosophical the-
orizing, nothing very special seems to be going on there. Also in scientific research
using case studies as a resource for investigation one has to negotiate the relationship
between the generalizable insights and the context-specific details. Even in the phys-
ical sciences single cases and experiments are sufficient for theorizing, as Shrader-
Frechette and McCoy (1994) point out in their study of case-based reasoning within
ecological sciences. According to them, ecologists often prefer case-specific knowl-
edge coupled with conceptual and methodological analysis to “ ‘ecological theoriz-
ing based on untestable principles and deductive inferences drawn from mathemat-
ical models’ ”(p. 244). The case-specific local knowledge allows various kinds of
inferences: they can be local to local, or local to many. In local to many reasoning,
the local knowledge is desituated to a more generic level, or used to construct typical
representatives or exemplars (see Morgan (2014)).
What needs to be recognized is that most scientific knowledge is local, or con-
structed from the local knowledge, being subject to various initial conditions and
environmental contexts. Moreover, while case studies provide a springboard for
theorizing and generalization, they are often also used to question earlier held the-
oretical views, or their generality. The case study methodology has also advantages
that spring forth from the way the evidential is woven together with theoretical. A
historical case study typically presents “ ‘a complex, often narrated, account that
. . . contains some of the raw evidence as well as its analysis and that ties together
many different bits and pieces in the study’ ” (Morgan, 2012, p. 668). Thus narra-
tive becomes a way to deal with what Morgan calls “ ‘evidential density,’ ” which
contributes to theoretical development by offering rich resources for a critical study
of different theoretical perspectives. This evidential richness is clearly one of the
benefits of case studies: many relevant factors do not need to be abstracted away
or shielded, as with laboratory studies and mathematical modeling. Consequently, it
seems a mistake to try to tease the evidential dimension of case studies apart from
their conceptual and interpretative content. Both are woven together in the theoret-
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ical narrative that aims to integrate different kinds and bits of evidence by show-
ing their interdependence (Morgan, 2012, p. 675). This theoretical-cum-conceptual
modality of case studies is so strong that even when case studies succeed to iden-
tify a novel interesting phenomenon, like the ‘street corner society’ (Whyte, 1943),
‘the community’s response was to understand the phenomena revealed as potentially
generic’ (Morgan, 2012, p. 673).
It is our claim, then, that the key to the epistemic value of case studies, in philos-
ophy of science, like in both natural and social sciences, lies in the way they weave
together different kinds of evidence with the conceptual analysis and theoretical de-
velopment. The observation that the same cases may be interpreted differently does
not seem to us so grave an objection, since, as pointed out by numerous scholars,
case studies often breed new interpretations of the same cases, as well as attempts to
confirm the results by new case studies and independent data (e.g. Shrader-Frechette
and McCoy (1994)). The three cases provide a good example of this practice of pre-
senting related case studies. As we have argued, they are largely in agreement con-
cerning Volterra’s work,23 and the theoretical and interpretative element can most
clearly be located to how Volterra’s work is contrasted with the work of other schol-
ars: Mendeleev, Darwin, and Lotka.
Finally, we remain skeptical of the idea that to justify case study methodology,
the cases should be typical of their kind—how do we know the typical without any
cases?—or somehow important or critical. The scientific record does not seem to
lend support to these kinds of claims either. Ankeny (2012) argues concerning de-
velopmental biology that many model organisms used as kind of ‘cases’ are now
regarded as presenting typical patterns of phenomena, while they were often orig-
inally selected for study for other reasons, such as convenience or ease of experi-
mental manipulation. And even when they turned out atypical, they still continued to
provide a focal point in the field, permitting investigation of variations in phenom-
ena or processes. We see this kind phenomenon taking shape also with the three case
studies on Volterra, each of which presents variations on the theme of modeling, de-
lineated with the help of contrasting Volterra’s work with that of other theorists.
References
Ankeny, R. A. (2012). Detecting themes and variations: The use of cases in devel-
opmental biology. Philosophy of Science, 79:644–654.
Bailer-Jones, D. (2009). Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science. Pittsburgh:
University Press.
Burian, R. (2001). The dilemma of case studies resolved: The virtues of using case
studies in the history and philosophy of science. Perspectives on Science, 9:383–
404.
23 Even though the differences between the three case studies with respect to Volterra’s work were
more substantial, such underdetermination of theories by data would be a common feature of other
scientific practices, too.
26 Tarja Knuuttila and Andrea Loettgers
Buss, L. (1987). The Evolution of Individuality. Princeton University Press.
Chang, H. (2012). Is Water H2O? Evidence, Pluralism and Realism. Boston Studies
in the Philosophy and History of Science. Dordrecht:Springer.
Contessa, G. (2007). Scientific representation, interpretation, and surrogative rea-
soning. Philosophy of Science, 74:48–68.
da Costa, N. C. A. and French, S. (2000). Models, theories and structures: Thirty
years on. Philosophy of Science, 67:116–127.
Darwin, C. (1882). The Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection. Mur-
ray.
French, S. and Ladyman, J. (1999). Reinflating the semantic approach. International
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 13:103–21.
Frigg, R. (2010). Models and fiction. Synthese, 172:251–268.
Gause, G. (1935). Studies in the ecology of the orthoptera. Ecology, 11:307–325.
Giere, R. N. (2004). How models are used to represent reality. Philosophy of Science
(Symposia), 71:742–752.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2006). The strategy of model-based science. Biology and Phi-
losophy, 21:725–740.
Haydon, D. and Lloyd, A. (1999). On the origins of the Lotka-Volterra equations.
Bulletin of the Ecological Society of America, 80:205–206.
Helm, G. (1898). Die Energetik. Verlag von Veit.
Howard, L. O. (1897). A study in insect parasitism: A consideration of the parasites
of the white-marked tussok moth with an account of their habits and interrela-
tions, and with descriptions of new species. U.S. Dep. Agric. Tech. Bull, 5:1–57.
Humphreys, P. (2002). Computational models. Proceedings of the Philosophy of
Science Association, 3:S1–S11.
Humphreys, P. (2004). Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism,
and Scientific Method. Oxford University Press.
Israel, G. (1991). Volterra’s analytical mechanics of biological associations (second
part). U.S. Dep. Agric. Tech. Bull., 5:1–57.
Israel, G. (1993). The emergence of biomathematics and the case of population dy-
namics: A revival of mechanical reductionism and darwinism. Science in Context,
6:469–509.
Israel, G. and Gasca, A. M. (2002). The Biology of Numbers: The Correspondence
of Vito Volterra on Mathematical Biology. Birkhäuser.
Kinzel, K. (2015). Narrative and evidence: How can case-studies from the history
of science support claims in the philosophy of science? Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science Part A, 49:48–57.
Knuuttila, T. (2005). Models, representation, and mediator. Philosophy of Science,
72:1260–1271.
Knuuttila, T. (2006). From representation to production: Parsers and parsing in
language technology. Sociology of Science, 25:41–55.
Knuuttila, T. (2013). Science in a new mode: Good old (theoretical) science
vs. brave new (commodified) knowledge production. Science and Education,
22:2443–2461.
1 Contrasting Cases: The Lotka-Volterra Model Times Three 27
Knuuttila, T. and Loettgers, A. (2013). The productive tension: Mechanisms vs.
templates in modeling the phenomena. In Humphreys, P. and Imbert, C., editors,
Representations, Models, and Simulations, pages 3–24. Routledge.
Knuuttila, T. and Loettgers, A. (2014). Varieties of noise: Analogical reasoning in
synthetic biology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 48:76–88.
Knuuttila, T. and Loettgers, A. (2015). Modelling as indirect representation? the
Lotka-Volterra model revisited. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Sci-
ence, in press.
Lancaster, E. R. (1884). The scientific results of the exhibition. Fisheries Exhibition
Literature, 4:405–442.
Loettgers, A. (2007). Model organisms, mathematical models, and synthetic models
in exploring gene regulatory mechanisms. Biological Theory, 2:134–142.
Lotka, A. (1910). Contribution to the theory of periodic reactions. The Journal of
Physical Chemistry, 14:271–274.
Lotka, A. (1920a). Analytical note on certain rhythmic relations in organic systems.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Art and Science, 42:410–415.
Lotka, A. (1920b). Undamped oscillations derived from the law of mass action.
Journal of the American Chemical Society, 42:1595–1598.
Lotka, A. (1925). Elements of Physical Biolgy. Williams and Wilkins.
Machamer, P. K., Darden, L., and Craver, C. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms.
Philosophie of Science, 67:1–25.
Maeki, U. (2009). Missing the world: Models as isolations and credible surrogate
systems. Erkenntnis, 70:29–43.
May, R. (1974). Biological populations with nonoverlapping genertations: Stable
cycles, and chaos. Science, 186:645–647.
Maynard-Smith, J. and E. Smathmáry, J. (1995). The Major Transitions in Evolu-
tion. Oxford University Press.
Morgan, M. (2012). Case studies: One observation or many? justification or discov-
ery? Philosophy of Science, 79:667–677.
Morgan, M. (2014). Resulting knowledge: Generic strategies and case studies. Phi-
losophy of Science, 81:1012–1024.
Morgan, M. and Morrison, M. (1999). Models as mediating instruments. In Morgan,
M. and Morrison, M., editors, Models as Mediators. Perspectives on Natural and
Social Science, pages 97–146. Cambridge University Press.
Ostwald, W. (1893). Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Chemie: Chemische Energie. Wil-
helm Engelman.
Pitt, J. C. (2001). The dilemma of case studies: Toward a heraclitian philosophy of
science. Perspectives on Science, 9:373–382.
Schickore, J. (2011). More thoughts on HPS: Another 20 years later. Perspectives
on Science, 19:453–481.
Scholl, R. and Räz, T. (2013). Modeling causal structures: Volterra’s struggle and
Darwin’s success. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 3:115–132.
Scudo, F. (1971). Vito Volterra and theoretical ecology. Theoretical Population
Biology, 2:1–23.
28 Tarja Knuuttila and Andrea Loettgers
Scudo, F. (1992). Vito Volterra, ecology and the quantification of Darwinism. Atti
del Convegno internazionale in memorie di Vito Volterra, Rome. Accademia
Nazionale dei Lincei.
Scudo, F. M. and Ziegler, J. R. (1978). In The Golden Age of Theoretical Ecology:
1923–1940. Springer-Verlag.
Servos, J. W. (1990). Physical Chemistry from Ostwald to Pauling: The Making of
a Science in America. Princeton University Press.
Shrader-Frechette, K. S. and McCoy, E. D. (1994). How the tail wags the dog: How
value judgments determine ecological science. Environmental Values, 3:107–120.
Simon, H. (1981). The Sciences of the Artifical. MIT Press.
Suárez, M. (2008). Scientific fictions as rules of inference. In Suárez, M., editor,
Fictions in science: philosophical essays on modeling and idealisation, pages
258–270. Routledge.
Thomson, W. R. (1922). Théorie de l’action des parasites entomophages. les for-
mules mathématiques du parasitisme cyclique. Comptes Rendus Acad. Sci. Paris,
174:1202–1204.
Volterra, V. (1901). On the attempts to apply mathematics to the biological and
social sciences. In Goodstein, J. D., editor, The Volterra Chronicles: Life and
Times of an Extraordinary Mathematician 1860–1940, pages 247–260. AMS.
Volterra, V. (1926a). Fluctuations in the abundance of a species considered mathe-
matically. Nature, CXVIII:558–560.
Volterra, V. (1926b). Variazioni e fluttuazioni del numero d’indivui in specie animali
conviventi. Memorie della R. Accademia Lincei, 2:31–113.
Volterra, V. (1927). Letter to nature. Nature, 119:12.
Volterra, V. (1928). Variations and fluctuations of the number of individuals in ani-
mal species living together. Journal du Conseil International Pour l’Exploration
de la Mer, 3:3–51.
Volterra, V. (1930). Theory of Functionals and of Integral and Integro-Differential
Equations. Blackie and Son.
Volterra, V. (1931). Leçons sur la Théorie Mathématique de la Lutte Pour la Vie.
Gauthier-Villars.
Volterra, V. (1936). La théorie mathématique de la lutte pour la vie et l’expérience
(a propos de deux ouvrages de C.F. Gause). Scientia, LX:169–174.
Volterra, V. (1937a). Applications des mathématiques á la biologie’.
L’Enseignement Mathématique, XXXVI:297–330.
Volterra, V. (1937b). Principes de biologie mathématique. Acta Biotheoretica, III:1–
36.
Volterra, V. and D’Ancona, U. (1935). Les associations biologiques au point de vue
mathématique. Hermann.
von Bertalanffy, L. (1968). General System Theory: Foundations, Development,
Applications. George Braziller.
Weisberg, M. (2007). Who is a modeler? British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 58(2):207–233.
Weisberg, M. (2013). Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the
World. Oxford University Press.
1 Contrasting Cases: The Lotka-Volterra Model Times Three 29
Weisberg, M. and Reisman, K. (2008). The robust Volterra principle. Philosophy
of Science, 75:106–131.
Whyte, F. (1943). The Street Corner Society. The Social Structure of an Italian
Slum. The University of Chicago Press.
Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and
the Machine. MIT Press.
View publication stats
